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Operation Desert Storm was not a "patriotic triumph" for many U.S. 
citizens. Numerous Americans silently disapproved of the war, while others 
defiantly created a movement of Gulf War dissenters. This reenactment of the 
antiwar movement will be the focus of this paper. More specifically, the paper 
will trace the inception, growth and decline of this oppositional movement. 
Methodologically, this paper studies the movement's ebbs and flows through a 
content analysis of newspapers and an ethnographic case study. In the end, this 
study reveals that the slow and steady growth of the movement during the last 
months of 1990 was surpassed by a rash of movement activity around the 
January onset of the war. Yet, this flurry of activity around the middle of 
January became a two-week milestone as the protest size began to shrink in 
February and early March. 
In 1991 the United States waged a ferocious war on Iraq. Despite 
George Bush's insistence that "there is no antiwar movement out there," 
millions of Americans were voicing th~ir objections to pollsters. However, 
this disapproval of the war was not limited to survey responses as thousands 
of Americans expressed their discontent by protesting in the streets. 
By the mid 1990's the existence of these protests had faded from the 
public's consciousness. Combining with this "normal citizen" amnesia is the 
fact that even some insightful peace scholars have minimized the size of the 
protests. For example, peace historian Charles Chatfield (1992) wrote, "So 
brief and militarily successful was the [GulfJ war ... that no significant 
opposition evolved" (p. xi) and Sociologists Sam Marullo et. al. (1996) said 
that the Gulf War inspired only a brief "'minisurge' in peace activism" (p. 
10). This paper challenges these characterizations by providing a systematic 
count of Gulf War protesters. 
PEACE MOVEMENTS AND PROTEST CYCLES 
A social movement can be seen as the collective process that occurs 
when a less powerful constituency challenges elite targets through non-
electoral techniques. Such challenges are transient in nature, since mobil-
izations seem to appear and disappear during specific periods. When move-
ments are "active," their intensity seems to fluctuate. Moreover, movements 
seem to follow episodes or stages of initial expansion and subsequent 
declines. 
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These modifications of movement size and activities have been 
called "mobilization spirals" (Tarrow, 1989; Lofland, 1992). Tarrow (1989) 
suggests that movement spirals are connected to changes in: (1) the pro-
duction and mediation of symbols that justify the mobilization; (2) the 
formation of movement coalitions; (3) the diffusion of activity from small 
clusters of activists to large sectors of the general populace; ( 4) the invention 
and modifications of tactics and repertoires of contention; and (5) an in-
crease in the intensity of conflicts with authority figures. Lofland (1992) adds 
that antiwar surges follow similar multidimensional patterns (i.e., the 
number of participants, the number of activists, the number of endorsing 
organizations, the types of funding sources, the extent of public support for 
the movement, the degree of elite approval, and changes in media packaging 
of the movement). 
PROTESTS AGAINST THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 
Earlier studies have addressed some facets of this antiwar 
mobilization. They have looked at the goals of the movement (Hunt and 
Benford, 1994; Coy and Woehrle, 1996), the extent of bystander sympathy 
for protesters (Pan et. al., 1993; Beamish, et. al., 1995), the structure of 
movement organizations (Elbaum, 1992; Epstein, 1992), the impact of 
protests on congressional war votes (MacDougall et. al., 1995), and the 
importance of identity and value commitments in antiwar activism (Swank, 
1993/94; Duncan and Stewart,1995). While these works have contributed to 
a rudimentary knowledge of the mobilization, they have limited themselves 
to cursory and impressionistic renditions of this movement's protest cycle. 
MEmODOLOGICAL CONCERNS: INDICATORS, 
SOURCES AND COUNTING PROCEDURES 
In contrast to any impressionistic accounts, this study undertakes a 
systematic measurement of U.S. protesters. Although the "perfect study" 
would have researchers at every American protest, a lack of resources 
usually blocks such an occurrence (one researcher cannot simultaneously be 
at several cities and not even a team of researchers can observe the 
thousands of concurrent protests which stretch from Seattle to Miami). 
Hence, logistical impositions routinely necessitate a reliance on secondary 
sources. 
Various types of secondary sources have been used in movement 
research. Though a few studies have used official archival records (i.e., Tilley 
et. al., 1975) or activist-generated histories (i.e., Rupp and Taylor, 1987), the 
vast majority of studies have used of newspapers for data (i.e., McAdam, 
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1982; Taylor and Jodice, 1983; Koopmans, 1993). In fact, around 90% of 
protest cycle articles found in Sociological Abstracts have used reporter 
informants. 
DATA SOURCES FOR miS PROJECT 
This study contains personal assessments of a local protest (Swank 
1993/1994). The crowd counts of San Diego's mobilization were derived 
through the "grid/density" approach (see Jacobs, 1967; Seidler et. al., 1976). 
This "grid/density" approach breaks the crowd into separate quadrants, 
counts the number of people in a single quadrant, and then multiplies this 
single quadrant count by the total number of quadrants. Although this 
approach has some limitations -- researchers may not create the proper 
number of quadrants or the density between quadrants may vary -- the over-
all system is relatively sound. That is, the "grid/density" approach is more 
reliable than intuitional guesstimates since it standardizes measurement 
protocols while other methods do not. 
After completing this study of a regional protest, I saw three reasons 
to construct a national sample. First, there could be generalizability 
problems if there is no convergence between the San Diego and national 
protest cycles. Second, a national sample frame seemed appropriate since 
the protests challenged a federal target. Finally, I assumed the inclusion of 
several information sources would enhance the validity of this project. That 
is, questions of measurement reliability can be explored by examining the 
extent of agreement or disagreement between press reports and the grid! 
density approach. 
PONDERING mE RELIABILI1Y 
OF SECONDARY SOURCES 
The reliability of size estimation hinges on the issues of 
"selectiveness," "standardization," and "bias" (Olzak, 1989; Ruch and 
Ohlemacher, 1992). When addressing selectiveness, we should ask about the 
frequency in which a source covered the number of protests for a given 
locale (i.e., the percentage of Southern Californian demonstrations covered 
by the San Diego Union-Tribune). Clearly those sources which miss most 
protests are extremely unreliable. For standardization, one can ask whether 
the estimator used some uniformed methods of computing crowd sizes. 
When addressing bias, we must question whether the observer's political 
loyalties caused them to inflate or deflate the size of the actual crowd. 
Communication studies suggest that news reports routinely founder 
on all three accounts (Gamson and Wolfson, 1993). Kielbowicz and Schrer's 
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(1986) review essay noted that: (1) reporters commonly neglect the sub-
stance of political critiques, instead focusing on the dramatic and unique 
vestiges of the movement; (2) reporters tend to disproportionately rely on 
the statements of conventional authorities to define the movement; 
(3) editors customarily send novice "general assignment" reporters to 
protests; (4) the beat schedules of reporters affects the probability of events 
being covered; (5) the proximity between a media outlet and the protest site 
affects the nature of media coverage; and (6) reporters' identities, political 
commitments, and conceptions of professional norms influence the type of 
coverage that movements attain. 
Two "empirical" studies substantiate these claims of selective 
coverage. Snyder and Kelly (1977) discovered that the New York Times ran 
a grand total of 22 protest stories in 1968. Conversely, the local papers of 
43 U.S. cities covered 120 protests during the same contentious year (this 
means that Times missed around 81% of the protests covered by other 
papers). A later study by McCarthy, McPhail and Smith (1996) showed that 
other papers mirrored the Times' selectivity problems, finding that only 7% 
of the 1,856 protests logged in Washington police files were ever covered by 
the New York Times, Washington Post, ABC, NBC, and CBS. Moreover, all 
sources but the Washington Post covered less than 2% of the total protests 
(the Post was best at 6 percent). 
This media/movement discrepancy also bled into antiwar coverage. 
Historian W.J. Rorabaugh (1989) suggests that the national and Bay Area 
newspapers frequently ignored the Free Speech and antiwar demonstrations 
that occurred at the University of California in the 1960's. Todd Gitlin 
(1982) and Melvin Small (1994) argued that newspapers repeatedly missed 
small and medium-size protests because editors quickly grew tired of 
covering "ordinary" or "conventional" demonstrations against the Vietnam 
war. Subsequently, the protests that occurred late in the protest cycle had 
to exhibit "sensational" flair in order to be considered "news-worthy" events 
(e.g., the spectacle of enormous size, or the exhibition of illicit behaviors by 
protesters). 
Recent studies indicate that the "corporate" media tried to suppress 
images of Gulf War opposition. A study of CBS, NBC, and ABC's nightly 
news casts found that of the 2,855 minutes of pre-January 3, 1991 reports on 
"Desert Shield" that only 29 minutes were dedicated to stories of opposition 
to military intervention (Lee and Devitt, 1991), while national newspapers 
devoted an average of 2.7% percent of their war stories to features on the 
peace movements (Dennis, 1992). Similarly, a study of Washington Post front 
pages articles found that 2% of "Gulf War" articles focused on antiwar 
activists (Kaid et. al., 1993) and a content analysis of three Kentucky 
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newspapers found that 4% of all Persian Gulf War reports contained 
information on demonstrations (Haney, 1993). 
Adding to this issue of media selectivity is the problem of biased 
reporting. During the stormy sixties, Daniel Hallin (1986) found that almost 
every CBS news story portrayed antiwar protesters as "traitors," "hard-core 
deviants," and "young misfits who threatened law and order." Similarly, the 
reports on Gulf War protests were generally presented in a stigmatized 
frame. Resse and Buckalew (1995) found that Texan reporters implied that 
Gulf War protesters were violent, and Hackett and Zhao (1994) noted that 
28% of printed stories portrayed activists as "oddballs" who were ill-informed 
and immature, while 46% of the stories stated that the protesters were 
"enemies" of the nation. 
Several studies suggest that this dislike of activists transfers into 
skewed size estimates. Anecdotally, Todd Gitlin (1982) noticed that a New 
York Times reporter admitted that he intentionally relied on police estimates 
although he knew they were severe undercounts and Small's book, Covering 
Dissent, shows how mainstream newspapers deflated movement counts by 
using police estimates to guide their front page headlines. In a similar light, 
Leon Mann's (1974) study of 22 U.S. newspapers found a statistical 
relationship between a paper's editorial position of the Vietnamese conflict 
and its ability to count people at antiwar protesters. That is, after classifying 
papers into the categories of "dove" or "hawk," Mann found that the four 
"dove" papers put 33,000 participants at a 1965 demonstration, while the 
seven "hawk" papers provided the average estimate of 20,600 for the same 
event. Finally, a paper by Murray Edelman (1986) highlights the extent of 
paper undercounts. After collecting estimates through the grid/density 
approach, Edelman turned to the pages of the San Francisco Chronicle and 
New York Times for their official accounts. Predictably, Edelman found that 
paper estimates for leftist demonstrations were always smaller than his 
grid/density counts of the same event (i.e., a demonstration against the 
Moral Majority produced a police estimate of 100 while the grid found 1000, 
an anti-KKK rally found a police count of 100-200 as the grid showed 350, 
and a Jesse Jackson speech drew 375 according to the police and 2000 
according to the grid). 
IMPROVING THE RELIABIU1Y OF 
NEWSPAPERS BY EXPANDING THE SAMPLE SIZE 
Listening to methodologists (i.e., Franzosi, 1987; Meyer, 1991), I 
created a stratified sample of several newspapers. The first stratum was 
composed of national news-sources: three news services (United Press 
International, Gannett, Newsbank) and four national papers (The New York 
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Times, Los Angeles Tunes, Washington Post, and USA Today). The second 
stratum consisted of local papers which were situated in all regions of the 
country. 
With the help of the Census Bureau's County and City Data Book 
(1994) the country was divided up into ten separate regions (New England, 
Middle Atlantic, East North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, 
West North Central, West South Central, Mountain, Pacific and Southwest). 
With these categories in place, I searched the largest newspapers in each 
subsection (largest number of daily subscribers). After using the directory 
Newspapers Online, I added the Boston Globe, Philadelphia Enquirer, Atlanta 
Constitution,Houston Post ,Louisville-Courier Joumai,St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 
Chicago Tribune, Denver Post, San Francisco Chronicle, and the Seattle Times 
to the sample. 
Supplementing these mainstream sources was a third stratum of 
"alternative" periodicals. Since the U.S. lacks a daily left paper, I had a 
choice between a list of weekly papers and monthly periodicals. After 
scanning the "alternative presses" of Z Magazine, The Progressive, Utne 
Reader, and In these Times, I added the New York weekly, the National 
Guardian, to the sample since every issue of the Guardian from December 
to March had a special section on the protests. 
Finally, I turned to a peace movement paper. Although the national 
organizations had fragmentary movement histories, a small group called the 
Nuclear Resisters collected an extensive list of protests. This Phoenix based 
collective became the "unofficial" clearinghouse of activist manuscripts 
because hundreds of antiwar coalitions faxed their reports to their Arizona 
office. This tiny group was so efficient in its efforts that its newsletter was 
routinely inundated with several pages of antiwar information. 
DATA COLLECTION AND CODING PROCEDURES 
I limited myself to articles that fell within a ten month time frame 
(August 1990 and May 1991). Furthermore, this selection of articles 
approximates a census of all printed reports since I used bounded and 
computerized indexes to locate the relevant articles. In the end, the papers 
yielded a total of 842 stories that appeared under the categories of "antiwar," 
"demonstrations," "Persian Gulf War."1 
1The breakdown of articles for each source is as follows: NeMI$bank n= 141; Los Angeles 
Times n=ll7; Washington Post n=82; UPJ n=81; San Francisco Chronicle n=64; USA Today 
n=SO; Boston Globe n=46; Seattle Times n=42; New Yotk Times n=37; Atlanta Constitution 
n=27; Denver Post n=21; Gannett n=25; National GUIJI'dian n=22; St. Louis Post Dispatch 
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FINDINGS 
SAN DIEGO 
Figure 1 reveals the general augmentation, expansion, and eventual 
decline in protest activity in San Diego, California. This graph indicates that 
the movement had a very small base of active protesters in the pre-
December days. Then the new year brought hordes of activists into the 
streets of San Diego. In fact, San Diego experienced some of its largest 
protests ever in the week that followed the bombardment of Iraq (January 
16, 1991 ). Yet, this rush of new activists began to taper off shortly thereafter 
since the number of active protesters significantly shrunk by the month of 
February. 
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n=l9; Chicago Tribune n=11; Louisvi/Je-Courierloumal n=11; Philadelphia Enquirer n=1S 
Houston Post, n=l3). 
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While Figure 1 reveals the general contours of the San Diego 
protest cycle, some further details are in order. In early August 1990, a few 
days after Bush's placement of troops in Saudi Arabia, a cluster of eight full 
time activists from Greenpeace, the Peace Resource Center, Alliance for 
Survival, Committee Opposed to Militarism and the Draft, Middle East 
Cultural and Information Center, National Lawyers Guild, and the Friends 
of Nicaraguan Culture formed the San Diego Coalition for Peace in the 
Middle East (SDCPME). This newly created coalition agreed to hold its first 
protest on October 20, 1990. 
On October 20, the Coalition for Peace in the Middle East held its 
first "No blood for oil" protest (n=400). The date of this protest was 
significant because it became the first day of coordinated protests among 
over 20 different U.S. cities. It should be noted that participants were 
predominantly people affiliated with one of the endorsing groups. 
After this demonstration, the SDCPME began an extensive 
recruiting drive. It held its first "public" organizational meeting in which the 
group spent five hours of debating the nuances of protest planning. After 
some heated exchanges, the group began to formalize its structure by 
creating special committees that would be responsible for certain tasks (i.e., 
working with the media, outreach to new communities, information 
gathering, and legal matters). When meeting ended, the group decided to 
sponsor weekly Sunday vigils and hold a "major demonstration" on Wars 
deadline (January 14). 
On December 9, 300 hundred people attended the first of many 
Sunday vigils in a local metropolitan park. Thereafter, the next month 
showed a slow and steady growth in the number of vigil protesters. One 
thousand participants attended a December 16 rally while around 800 people 
attended the December 23 and December 30 vigils. Then in January the 
crowds doubled their size, with the January 6 and January 13 vigils growing 
to 2,000 and 2,500 people respectively. Finally, the students at the University 
of California in San Diego (UCSD) threw a teach-in which drew 1000 
participants. 
This gradual growth in protest size preceeded a dramatic surge of 
activism. The January 14 "eve of the bombing" vigil drew 10,000 people to 
a Monday night protest. This candlelight vigil attracted many "first time" 
protestors and had a very civil tone. Then on January 16, a UCSD "die-in" 
drew 1000 participants and SDCPME impromptu January 17 protest 
attracted 4,500 protestors. 
The San Diego organizers quickly learned that this influx of activists 
would be short-lived and that the January 14 event would represent the peak 
number of demonstrators and activities. By January 20, an extremely sedate 
Sunday vigil drew 2,500 protesters. A more rambunctious crowd of 1,800 
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showed up for a January 27 protest, while the February 23 demonstration 
which foreshadowed the looming land invasion drew only 1000 participants. 
By March 3, only 300 "longtime activists" attended the final Gulf War march. 
NATIONAL PROTESTS 
The sources found 1,225,567 activists at a total of 1,365 protests. A 
large percentage of this grand total was found in the two days of national 
protest. Table 1 shows that national protests in San Francisco and 
Washington on January 19 each drew more than 40,000 participants while 
the same streets were filled with over 90,000 activists the preceding weekend. 
-----------~~----·-----
Table 1: The Largest Protests in U.S. Cities 
City Size City Size 
Washington (l/26) 154.565 Seattle (1/19) 5,200 
Portland (1/11) 5,000 
San Francisco ( 1/26) 95,000 Chicago (1/14) 5,000 
New York (1/14) 5,000 
San Francisco (1/19) 49,000 Washington ( 1/14) 5.000 
Washington (1/19) 40,290 Chicopee, MA (1/15) 5,000 
Seattle (l/14) 30.000 New York (l/15) 5.000 
Austin, TS (1/16) 5,000 
Portland (1112) 14,000 Minneapolis (l/16) 5,000 
New York (10/20) 13.000 New York (1116) 5.000 
Boston (12/1) 12.000 Portland (1/16) 5.000 
San Diego (1/16) 5,000 
Minneapolis (l/13) 10,000 San Francisco ( 1/16) 5,000 
San Francisco (1/15) 10.000 San Antonio (1/29) 5.000 
San Francisco (1/16) 10.000 Chicago (12/8) 4.500 
Portland (1/18) 10,000 Austin (1/11) 4.500 
Chicago (l/17) 4,300 
San Francisco ( 1 0/20) 8,000 Washington (1115) 4,200 
San Diego (1/14) 8,000 Seattle ( 12/ I) 4,000 
Denver ( 1/12) 4,000 
New York (l/17) 7,500 Los Angeles (1/13) 4,000 
San Francisco (2./21) 7,000 Milwaukee (l/14) 4,000 
Chicago (l/12) 6,000 Atlanta (1/15) 4,000 
San Francisco (I /21) 6,000 Boston (1/15) 4,000 
Los Angeles (1/12) 6,000 Cincinnati (1115) 4,000 
Portland (2/ 16) 6,000 Minneapolis ( 1117) 4,000 
San Francisco ( 1 /17) 5,700 Los Angeles (1/26) 4,000 
Los Angeles (211 ) 5,500 Oakland (2/24) 4,000 
New York (2/17) 5,500 San Deign (1/19) 4,000 
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Although the largest protests were of the national sort, local antiwar 
groups mustered up some fairly large protests. Table 1 reveals that eight 
regional protests drew at least 10,000 participants and 41 drew between 
9,999 and 4,000 adherents. Moreover, Table 1 ignores the fact that 24 vigils 
drew around 3,000 to 4,000 demonstrators,2 and thirty-six antiwar events 
amassed between 2,000 and 3,000 dissenters.' 
When adding the time line to these protest counts one sees some 
similar patterns of movement growth in both the national and San Diego 
settings (for Figures 1 and 2 the correlation coefficient equals .80). Both 
figures show that the movement swelled in size during the last two weeks of 
January 1991. Moreover, both figures show a marked decrease in protests 
in early February with a small increase in the late days of February. 
A more detailed comparison of these data reveals some slight 
divergences between the nation's and San Diego's protest waves. Protests 
were staged earlier in the national scene. Right after the first troop 
deployment (late August to early September 1990), several cities saw small 
and sporadic protests. In fact, cities such as Boston, Cleveland, Minneapolis 
and Tucson witnessed small protests in early August, and New York City 
experienced a protest of around 2,200 activists on September 13. 
During this September and early October stint, a band of seasoned 
activists were assembling the vestiges of the first national coalition. On 
October 20, the newly formed Coalition Against U.S. Intervention in the 
Middle East convinced a confederation of fledgling groups to hold 
concurrent protests in their respective cities.4 While some of these twenty 
simultaneous protests carried a large number of activists (New York 11,900 
or San Francisco 7,000), most protests gathered around 400 to 500 
protestors (i.e., Los Angeles, Minneapolis, or Missoula, Montana). 
2 The twenty-four protests that collected between 3,000 and 4,000 demonstrators resided in 
New York City (2), San Jose (2), UC Berkeley (2), UC Santa Cruz (2), UC Santa Barbara (2), 
Atlanta, Bellingham, W A, Boulder, CO, Boston, Cincinnati, Denver, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, 
Nevada Test Site, Philadelphia, San Diego, St. Louis, UCLA, and Washington. 
3 The thirty-six demonstrations that attracted between 2,000 and 3,000 protestors occurred 
in Los Angeles (5), Seattle (3), Boston (2), Des Moines (2), Montpelier, VT(2), New York City 
(2), University of Wisconsin (2), Denver, Eugene, Houston, Ohio State University, Missoula, 
Oakland, Olympia, WA, Philadelphia, San Diego, San Francisco, Santa Cruz, University of 
Indiana, University of Michigan, University of Washington, UC Berkeley, Washington and 
Western Washington University. 
• On this date protests occurred in Atlanta, Baton Rogue, Birmingham, Boston, Chicopee, 
WA, Cleveland, Dallas, Honolulu, Houston, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Missoula, 
MN, New York, Olympia, Philadelphia, Portland, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington. 
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This coordinated event became an anomaly and lasted only one day 
(the next national protests follow three months later). In November, the 
leadership of local antiwar coalitions delayed further attempts to build a 
national movement. Instead regional groups focused on outreach and 
recruitment efforts. This meant that the cadre of peace activists put most of 
their efforts into creating pools of adherents who would be willing to protest 
in future events. Subsequently, this strategy resulted in the enactment of 
small and irregularly placed protests throughout the month of November. 
While the community activists were trying to recruit new 
sympathizers, a handful of college protest were starting to evolve.5 Under 
the banner of growing student opposition, a handful of private universities 
generated protests (i.e., Stanford, Columbia, Dartmouth, Brandies, and 
Notre Dame). On the west coast, six of the seven University of California 
campuses saw protests on their grassy compounds (i.e., 1,200 demonstrators 
at both UC Santa Cruz and UC Santa Barbara), and Montana State and the 
' In fact the sources for this study found 27 college protests during this November period. 
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University of Utah saw their lecture halls turn into teach-ins. Even the large 
Midwestern universities saw antiwar activities in November (i.e., November 
protests drew 1,500 at the University of Michigan, 600 at the University of 
Wisconsin, 200 at Iowa State and 100 at the University of Kansas). 
In December, the movement experienced a new synergy. The 
community and college protests added new members, and these separate 
mobilizations began uniting forces more regularly. In the pre-Christmas 
weeks of December, the political hubs of this country were able to generate 
protests that numbered in the thousands (i.e., Boston 11,000, Chicago 4,500 
or New York City 5,000). At the same time, mid-size communities such as 
Atlanta, Detroit, Lincoln, Milwaukee, and Phoenix were arranging protests 
that netted hundreds of activists while smaller towns like Akron, Evanston, 
Stratford, and Annapolis were generating smaller gatherings. 
This gradual and incremental growth stopped in the month of 
January. The nation saw a flurry of protests by the middle part of the month 
(85 protests on January 14, 144 on January 15, 95 on January 16, and 133 
on January 17). Adding to the increase of events was a drastic increase int 
the size of these events (each day from January 14 to January 17 had over 
80,000 U.S. protestors). In fact, the outpouring was so immense that 31 
protests surpassed the 5,000 mark from January 12 to January 26. 
There were several aspects to this galvanized state of the movement. 
By early January, many of the previously mobilized centers became meccas 
of activism (i.e., San Francisco, Portland, Seattle, Minneapolis, or New York 
City). For cities of this sort, protests routinely numbered in the thousands 
during this January peak. Moreover, the traditional weekly protests were 
supplanted by successive protests that occurred every day of the week. 
Yet, one would be wrong to conclude that this proliferation and 
escalation of protests were confined to the "progressive" sites of the United 
States. Cities in America's heartland also saw an enormous rush of activism 
in January. From January 12 to 26 cities such as Baltimore, Cincinnati, Des 
Moines, Detroit, Fort Collins, Little Rock, Milwaukee, Missoula, New 
Orleans, Salt Lake City, St. Louis, and Tallahassee had protests that 
exceeded 1000 participants. Also in that same time span, some medium sized 
towns such as Albuquerque, Fort Wayne, Duluth, Hartford, Iowa City, 
Knoxville, Rockford, Sacramento, and Tampa had protests that almost 
reached the 1000 person plateau. Even small towns such as Boise, Bozeman, 
Flagstaff, Lansing, Omaha, Rapid City, and Willmington created protests 
that surpassed 500 participants. 
Meanwhile, the spark of activism was igniting on college campuses. 
The campuses which experienced earlier protests were hopping with student 
demonstrations. Both research institutes (like Indiana University, the 
Universities of Michigan, Washington, and Wisconsin) and some private 
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settings (such as Stanford, Columbia, Harvard, and USC) held protests that 
went beyond crowds of one thousand.6 Previously dormant campuses also 
become alive with protests. For example, protests at western schools drew 
over 300 at Brigham Young, Colorado College, Western Washington 
University and San Diego City College, while Midwestern protests drew 
crowds of 700 at Kent State, 700 at Michigan State, 500 at Northwestern, 
and 1000 at Purdue. 
By the end of January this plethora of local protests began to amass 
into enormous national demonstrations. On January 19, over 35,000 
protesters from the entire country visited the cities of San Francisco and 
Washington. But, these first national protests were simply a foreshadowing 
of the enormous ones held the following week. On January 26, the oval in 
our national capital had around 120,000 protesters and the Golden Gate 
Bridge held over 75,000 protesters. 
While these national protests were large, one could say that this 
pinnacle of activism was a fleeting phenomenon. By the first weeks of 
February, our newspapers reported the public demonstrations receded to 
December like numbers. This supposed contraction took three routes. First, 
the smaller urban centers that had sudden protests around January 15 halted 
their spontaneous protests by February. Thus, secluded cities such 
Shreveport, Boise or El Paso discontinued their brief flurry of protests after 
the Pentagon promised an "easy" rout of Iraq. Second, the political hotbeds 
were unable to sustain their peak of January activism (i.e., a citywide protest 
in Chicago on January 12 drew 6,000 while the same call for protests 
gathered 600 on February 16, or the Minneapolis demonstrations fell from 
a height of 10,000 January 13 protestors to 600 on February 10). Third, 
sources suggest that protests on college campuses almost evaporated 
between February 1 and February 14 (the papers claim that only seven 
protests happened on U.S. campuses in this two-week period). 
Fearing a pending March invasion of Kuwait, movement leadership 
tried to counteract the movement's February slump. However, the attempts 
to revitalize this shrinking movement were met with moderate results. A few 
local coalitions could resurrect somewhat big crowds in late February (i.e., 
3,000 in Boulder and Seattle), but these larger February protests were rare 
events and never reached their previous peaks. In fact, the last two weeks 
of February only netted three protests that crested around 5,000 activists, 
and the four next largest protests in this period barely passed the 3,000 
mark. Similarly, attempts to rekindle a withering campus movement 
6 The University of California campuses at Berkeley, Davis, Los Angeles, San Diego, Santa 
Barbara, and Santa Cruz had numerous protests that exceeded that 1500 mark. 
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produced minimal results. For example, on February 21, the day of "national 
college dissent" attracted a small list of 22 participating campuses. Further, 
the largest size of these protests numbered 600 at the University of Oregon, 
while the other protests fell in the 500 to 100 range. This modest upswing 
in activism was the last hurrah for the movement. By the first days of March, 
the February practices of dwindling protests was juxtaposed by a glaring 
absence of protests. 
DISCUSSION 
One can reach several conclusions from this study. First, the 
relatively strong correlation between the size of San Diegan and national 
mobilizations suggests that this paper captures the general contours of this 
phenomena. Second, the absence of operational definitions for "maxi," 
"midi," or "mini" surges would not preclude us from asserting that this was 
a "significant opposition" in many ways. That is, one would probably agree 
that minisurges do not have over one million participants or that a minisurge 
would not have one of the largest protests in Washington history (Bryant, 
1993, suggests that the Washington Post has only seen thirteen protests which 
were larger than the January 27 Gulf War protests). Furthermore, one 
would not call the Gulf War protests a "small mobilization" since the size of 
every 1982 mobilization did not surpass the size of this antiwar movement 
(McCarthy et. al., 1996). Finally, this study found 74 Gulf War protests with 
over 3,000 participants, while a thirty-year study of Washington Post articles 
found only 43 protests that reached that plateau (Everett, 1992). 
Nevertheless, Gulf demonstrations should not be considered the 
biggest antiwar movement in U.S. history. These protests did not reach the 
heights of the 600,000 demonstrators at the 1969 Vietnam War Moratorium 
or the 500,000 at the 1971 Vietnam "Out Now" rally (numbers by Bryant 
1993). Similarly, it is clear that the 1990's college protest scene did not 
match the estimated 4,350,000 student protestors of the 1960's and 1970s 
(Heinemen, 1993, p. 249). 
However a strictly numerical comparison can be misleading. Each 
mobilization was set in different socio-historical contexts. The Presidential 
rationales for the wars were different. One war was supposedly stopping the 
"spreading cancer of Communism," while the other war was said to be the 
freeing of a virtuous country from a rogue Arab state. The fate of the wars 
also differed. One war required a draft, had higher causalities, and lasted 
three decades, while the Gulf War was seen as quick drubbing of Iraq which 
cost few American lives. Moreover, the media's played different roles in 
each war. The media removed sights of mutilation from Gulf War footage 
while the images of death from Southeast Asia were consistently brought 
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into American family rooms. Finally, it may have been easier to organize an 
antiwar mobilization in the sixties since college students had more free time 
and there were blocks of seasoned activists who could siphon off the civil 
rights movement. 
Since contemporary activists face such an unconducive situation, one 
may be surprised by the existence of any Gulf War protests. Others may be 
shocked by the anomaly of a proactive antiwar movement. That is, 
researchers should take note of that this mobilization preceded the bombing 
while most U.S. antiwar movements were reactions to ongoing wars (keep 
in mind that first national protest against Vietnam came after years of 
American involvement in that "police action"). Hence, a two-folded 
conclusion emerges. This antiwar movement showed an initial capacity to 
mobilize early protests, however these capacities were quickly tapped as the 
movement shrunk into abeyance within a few months. 
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